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Abstract—A class of data integrity attack, known as false data
injection (FDI) attack, has been studied with a considerable
amount of work. It has shown that with perfect knowledge
of the system model and the capability to manipulate a cer-
tain number of measurements, the FDI attacks can coordinate
measurements corruption to keep stealth against the bad data
detection. However, a more realistic attack is essentially an attack
with limited adversarial knowledge of the system model and
limited attack resources due to various reasons. In this paper,
we generalize the data attacks that they can be pure FDI attacks
or combined with availability attacks (e.g., DoS attacks) and
analyze the attacks with limited adversarial knowledge or limited
attack resources. The attack impact is evaluated by the proposed
metrics and the detection probability of attacks is calculated
using the distribution property of data with or without attacks.
The analysis is supported with results from a power system use
case. The results show how important the knowledge is to the
attacker and which measurements are more vulnerable to attacks
with limited resources.
I. Introduction
The integration of information and communication technol-
ogy (ICT) and power systems makes the intelligent power
grids typical cyber-physical systems. These systems are oper-
ated by means of complex distributed software systems which
transmit information through wide and local area networks [1].
Thus the intelligent power grids would be exposed to a large
number of security threats [2], [3]. The heterogeneity, diver-
sity, and complexity of intelligent power grids may introduce
new vulnerabilities that may lead to severe consequences [4].
The State Estimation (SE) within modern energy manage-
ment systems (EMS) is an instance of such dependency. It is
supported by the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) system for data delivery and provides important in-
formation to the EMS for power grids monitoring and control.
SE uses measurements collected by the Remote Terminal Units
(RTUs) in substations and transmitted through the SCADA
communication network to the control center. There is a
built-in bad data detection (BDD) process in SE to detect
erroneous measurements. The estimated state information is
then processed by other applications in EMS such as optimal
power flow (OPF) and Contingency Analysis (CA) to compute
optimal control action while ensuring reliability and safety.
The critical nature of SE highlights the importance of making
it accurate and secure for power grid operations. In order to
increase the security of SE and EMS, one needs to conduct
vulnerability and attack impact assessment. Some of the liter-
ature has already tackled these problems. Vulnerability of SE
to data integrity attack (e.g., false data injection (FDI) attack)
is quantified by computing the attack resources needed by the
adversary to keep stealth against the BDD [5]–[7]. The attack
impacts of FDI attacks on SE, such as introduced estimate
errors [8], potential economic loss in market operation [9],
[10], physical damaging like line overflows, are also well
presented and analyzed. Besides, the FDI attacks with limited
knowledge or limited resources are discussed by restricting the
knowledge of the adversary to a part of the system model [11]
or a subset of the network [12], or restricting the capability
of the attacker to manipulate the number of sensors [8]. Our
recent work [13] extends the attack scenarios that the SE can
be corrupted by FDI attacks and data availability attacks (e.g.,
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks) simultaneously.
In this paper we aim to contribute in analyzing data at-
tacks with limited adversarial knowledge and limited attack
resources. Here the data attacks are “generalized” that can be
pure integrity attacks (i.e. FDI attacks) or combined integrity
and availability attacks. In order to achieve this, we introduce
attack vectors for FDI attacks and availability attacks respec-
tively and formulate attack strategies under both scenarios of
limited knowledge and limited resources. To compare attacks
under these two scenarios, we also propose attack impact
metrics for evaluating attack impact on load estimate and
provide methods to calculate detection probability of the
attacks under these two scenarios. We show how important
the knowledge of the system model is to the adversary and
which measurements have the priority to be protected when
attacks have limited resources. The analysis is supported with
results from a case study.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section II details
the state estimation techniques, the optimal attack strategy
with full knowledge and attack resources. The attack impact
metrics are also proposed to evaluate impact on load estimate.
In Section III, the first scenario that attacks with limited
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adversarial knowledge is discussed. The method to calculate
the detection probability of the attacks is discussed and a
special case of limited knowledge scenario is specified. The
second scenario that attacks with limited attack resources is
presented in detail in Section IV, including the optimal data
attacks with limited resources and the computation solution for
solving it. Section V shows the results from the case study.
The conclusion remarks are in Section VI.
II. System Model and Data Attacks
In this section, we review the basic state estimation problem
and discuss the optimal data attacks with perfect knowledge
and full resources. The attack impact metrics are also formu-
lated.
A. DC State Estimation and Bad Data Detection
A power system model has a number of buses connected
by transmission lines. The measurement data collected by
RTUs includes line power flow measurements and bus power
injection (generation, load) measurements. In the formulation,
we use the DC power system model by neglecting the reactive
power, line losses and assuming the voltage magnitudes to
be constant. This model is commonly employed in security
analysis of SE.
We assume that there are n + 1 buses and nt transmission
lines in the power network. Line power flow and bus power
injection measurements are collected by RTUs in each sub-
station. These m power flow measurements are denoted by
z = [z1, . . . ,zm]T . The DC SE solves the following problem,
z =
 P1WB
T
−P2WBT
P3B0WBT
 x + e := Hx + e, (1)
where H ∈ Rm×n represents the system model, depending on
the parameters of transmission lines (i.e., matrix W), the
network topology (i.e., matrix B0) and the placement of RTUs
(i.e., matrices P1, P2, P3). Here the topology is described
by a directed incidence matrix B0 ∈ R(n+1)×nt in which the
directions of the lines can be arbitrarily specified [7]. Matrix
B ∈ Rn×nt is the truncated incidence matrix with the row
in B0 corresponding to the reference bus removed. Matrix
W ∈ Rnt×nt is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries are
the reciprocals of transmission line reactance. Matrices P1,
P2 and P3 are stacked by the rows of identity matrices,
indicating whether a particular line power flow at the both
sides of lines or bus power injection is measured. The total
number of rows of P1, P2 and P3 is m. The state vector
x = [x1, . . . , xn]T refers to phase angles on each bus except the
reference one and e ∼N(0,R) is the measurement noise vector
of independent zero-mean Gaussian variables with covariance
matrix R = diag(σ21, . . . ,σ
2
m).
The state estimate xˆ can by obtained using weighted least
squares (WLS) estimate:
xˆ = argmin
x
(z−Hx)T Σ−1(z−Hx), (2)
which can be solved as
xˆ = (HT R−1H)−1HT R−1z := Kz. (3)
To validate state estimates, the bad data detection schemes
are used to detect erroneous measurements. The algorithms of
the BDD within SE are based on the measurement residual
r = z−Hxˆ = (I−HK)z := S z, (4)
where r ∈ Rm is the residual vector, I ∈ Rm×m is an identity
matrix, and S is the so-called residual sensitivity matrix
[14]. The BDD is based on checking whether the p-norm of
(weighted) measurement residual is below some threshold τ.
In this paper we choose the J(xˆ)-test based BDD, which uses
the quadratic function J(xˆ) = ‖R−1/2r‖22 to check if it follows
the chi-squared distribution χ2m−n. The BDD scheme becomes{
Good data, if ‖R−1/2r‖22 ≤ τ(α),
Bad data, if ‖R−1/2r‖22 > τ(α),
(5)
where τ(α) is the threshold corresponding to the false alarm
rate α. Defining the probability distribution function (PDF) of
χ2m−n, τ(α) can be obtained by solving∫ τ(α)
0
f (x)dx = 1−α. (6)
B. Optimal Data Attacks with Perfect Knowledge and Full
Resources
An adversary aims to perturb the state estimate and keep
stealth against the BDD, by tampering of RTUs, the SCADA
system or even the SCADA master in the control center. To
generalize the potential data attack, we assume that the attacker
will use all tools available and can launch both data integrity
and availability attacks. Corrupted by such data attacks, the
measurement vector z is changed into
z := (I−diag(d))z + a, (7)
where a ∈ Rm is the FDI attack vector, d ∈ {0,1}m is the
availability attack vector and I ∈ Rm×m is an identity matrix.
Throughout this paper we define diag(d) as the m×m diagonal
matrix with the elements of vector d on the main diagonal. To
describe the number of attacked measurements needed by the
adversary, we have the following definition of a (ka,kd)-tuple
attack,
Definition 1 ((ka,kd)-tuple attack). A data attack with an
FDI attack vector a ∈ Rm and an availability attack vector
d ∈ {0,1}m described above is called a (ka,kd)-tuple attack if
‖a‖0 = ka, ‖d‖0 = kd.
In our recent work [13], we showed that if the attacker has
the perfect knowledge of the system model (i.e., H) and can
manipulate certain number of measurements with full attack
resources to perform a (ka,kd)-tuple attack, it can keep stealth
against the BDD by introducing the two attack vectors a and d
satisfying a = (I−diag(d))Hc where c ∈Rn is non-zero. Under
a such (ka,kd)-tuple attack, we define the matrix of the system
model and the noise vector as a function of the attack vector
d,
Hd := (I−diag(d))H, ed := (I−diag(d))e. (8)
where Hd denotes the model of the remaining measurements
and it is obtained from H by replacing some rows with zero
row vectors due to availability attacks on these measurements,
ed is the noise vector for remaining measurements and the
entries of it are zero if the corresponding measurements are
unavailable. According to the formulation of matrix K in (3)
and matrix S in (4), we can also have
Kd := (HTd R
−1Hd)−1HTd R
−1, (9)
S d := I−HdKd. (10)
An optimal attack pursue minimum attack resources. To
simplify the discussion, we assume that an optimal attack can
have the minimum attack resources when it needs to corrupt
the minimum number of measurements. For the adversary with
the capability to manipulate a certain number of measurements
and perfect knowledge of the system model, we formulate the
optimal attack strategy as the following optimization problem,
(c∗,d∗) := argmin
c,d
‖a‖0 + ‖d‖0
s.t. a = Hdc, (11a)
Hd = (I−diag(d))H, (11b)
a( j) = µ, (11c)
d(i) ∈ {0,1} for all i.
Here in (11b) we assume a( j) = µ where µ is the non-zero at-
tack magnitude on the target measurement j. For measurement
j, the optimal attack with attack vectors d∗ and a∗ = Hd∗c∗
has the minimum number of measurements to corrupt and
correspondingly has the minimum attack resources. To solve
the optimization problem above, we propose a computation
solution which uses the big M method:
(c∗,w∗,d∗) := argmin
c,w,d
m∑
i=1
w(i) +
m∑
k=1
d(k)
s.t. Hc ≤ M(w + d), (12a)
−Hc ≤ M(w + d), (12b)
H( j, :)c = µ, (12c)
w(i) ∈ {0,1} for all i, (12d)
d(k) ∈ {0,1} for all k, (12e)
where w,d ∈ {0,1}m in (12d) and (12e). w(i) = 1 and d(k) = 1
means that FDI attack and data availability attack take place
on measurement i and k respectively. The following theorem,
which is adopted from our work [13], states that the optimal
solution to (11) can be exactly obtained by solving (12).
Theorem 1. For any measurement index j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and
non-zero µ, let (c∗, w∗, d∗) be an optimal solution to (12).
Then an optimal solution to (11) can be computed as (c∗, d∗).
C. Attack Impact Metric
As the work in [15] [16] shows, the OPF application uses the
load estimate as the inputs provided by SE. If data attacks take
place and pass the BDD, the load estimate get perturbed and
it will influence the control actions in the next time interval.
Therefore, we consider the impact metric as a function of the
bias introduced by the attack on the load estimate.
Assuming that there are min j injection (with load) measure-
ments, we consider the impact on the errors of power injection
(with load) estimate, which can be described as
 = zˆin j,a,d − zin j, (13)
where zin j ∈ Rmin j is the vector of power injection (with
load) measurements without attacks and zˆin j,a,d ∈ Rmin j is the
vector of estimated injection (with load) measurements under
a (ka,kd)-tuple attack. We can further obtain
 = Hin j xˆa,d − (Hin jx + ein j), (14)
where xˆa,d = Kdz = x + Kded + Kda, Hin j ∈ Rmin j×n denotes
the submatrix of H by keeping the rows corresponding to
injection (with load) measurements, i.e. Hin j = Min jH where
Min j ∈ Rmin j×m is the incidence matrix for selecting the rows
in H corresponding to injection (with load) measurements,
ein j ∈ Rmin j is the noise vector for injection (with load) mea-
surements. Thus  = Hin jKda−Min jS de. The expected value
of injection (with load) estimate errors is
E() = Hin jKda. (15)
We have the following definition for the attack impact metric,
Definition 2. The impact metric I(a,d) for quantifying attack
impact of a (ka,kd)-tuple attack with attack vectors a and d
on load estimate is defined as the 2-norm of Hin jKda, i.e.
I(a,d) = ‖Hin jKda‖2.
III. Scenario 1: Attacks with Limited Adversarial
Knowledge
In this section, we consider the first scenario that the
adversary has limited knowledge of the system model and
discuss how this would affect the detectability of data attacks.
A. Perturbed Model Known by the Attacker
In Section II-B, the attacks are assumed to have perfect
knowledge of the system model. This requires knowledge on
topology matrix B0, the line parameter matrix W and the
RTU placement matrix P1, P2, P3. Such knowledge can be
obtained by recording and analyzing data sent from RTUs
using statistical methods. However, due to restricted access
to the power grid, errors in data collection and analyzing may
essentially result in an attack with limited knowledge of the
system model. We denote the perturbed system model known
by the attacker as H˜, such that
H˜ = H +∆H, (16)
where ∆H ∈ Rm×n denotes the part of model uncertainty
because of the issues discussed above.
B. Detection Probability of Attacks
When the measurements are corrupted by a (ka,kd)-tuple
attack, the measurement residual r(a,d) can be written as
r(a,d) = S dz = S ded + S da. (17)
As discussed in Section II-B, when the vectors of the
(ka,kd)-tuple attack satisfy a = Hdc, the residual r(a,d) =
S ded +S dHdc = S ded due to S dHd = 0. Then the residual is not
affected by a and no increase of alarms would triggered in the
BDD since the BDD would treat the measurements attacked
by availability attacks as a case of data missing. However,
when the attacker has limited knowledge of the system model,
the attack vector a becomes a = (I − diag(d))H˜c := H˜dc and
S da may be non-zero in this case. The measurement residual
is incremented and the attack can be detected with some
probability. In the following we show how the detection
probability can be calculated.
Note that the quadratic cost function with a (ka,kd)-tuple
attack becomes Ja,d(xˆ) = ‖R−1/2r(a,d)‖22. We can further ob-
tain Ja,d(xˆ) = ‖R−1/2S ded + R−1/2S da‖22. Here the mean of
(R−1/2S ded + R−1/2S da) becomes non-zero R−1/2S da incre-
mented by the attack. Under the (ka,kd)-tuple attack, Ja,d(xˆ)
has a generalized non-central chi-squared distribution with
m− n− kd degrees of freedom. We use Ja,d(xˆ) as an approx-
imation of having the non-central chi-squared distribution
χ2m−n−kd (‖R−1/2S da‖22) to calculate the detection probability,
where λa,d = ‖R−1/2S da‖22 is the non-centrality parameter. In
[17], we have validated such approximation using empirical
results from Monte Carlo simulation. It implies that data
attacks with limited adversarial knowledge would increase the
possibility to trigger alarms in BDD due to the introduced
non-zero non-centrality parameter. We can get∫ τd(α)
0
fλa,d (x)dx = 1−δa,d, (18)
where fλa,d (x) is the PDF of χ
2
m−n−k−d(‖R−1/2S da‖22), τd(α) is
the threshold set in the BDD using (6) but with the PDF of
χ2m−n−kd , and δa,d is the detection probability of the (ka,kd)-
tuple attack. In order to keep stealth against the BDD, the
attacker has to minimize δa,d as close to the false alarm rate
α as possible.
C. A Special Case of Limited Adversarial Knowledge
The model uncertainty defined in (16) is “general” and can
be any values. An interesting analysis is to understand what the
model uncertainty ∆H could be to the adversary. In particular,
we are interested in the case where the adversary knows the
exact topology of the power network and the placement of
RTUs, but has limited information of the line parameters. This
can be expected due to various practical reasons as explained
in [11], e.g., limited access to the knowledge of exact position
of the tap changer and the exact length of the transmission
line and type of the conductor being used. Thus the perturbed
system model known by the adversary becomes
H˜ = P
 (W +∆W)B
T
−(W +∆W)BT
B0(W +∆W)BT
 , (19)
where ∆W ∈ Rnt×nt denotes the error on estimate of transmis-
sion line reactance.
IV. Scenario 2: Attacks with Limited Attack Resources
In this section we consider the second scenario where the
adversary has limited attack resources but still targets to keep
stealth against the BDD and have maximum attack impact.
A. Optimal Data Attacks with Limited Attack Resources
The attack policies in Section II-B for the (ka,kd)-tuple
attacks follow the linear model and the adversary is assumed
to be able to attack a certain number of measurements, i.e.,
ka + kd ≥ min‖a∗‖0 + ‖d∗‖0 where attack vectors d∗ and a∗ =
Hd∗c∗ are obtained by solving (12) for any measurement index
j. Now we consider the following scenario that the attacker
has limited attack resources that ka + kd < min‖a∗‖0 + ‖d∗‖0
and thus can not follow the linear attack policies above.
For the sake of comparison, in this scenario we assume that
the attacker has full knowledge of the system model and
enough computational capability. In the following we construct
the optimal attack strategy for the (ka,kd)-tuple attacks with
limited attack resources, which is also the worst case from the
perspective of system operation.
The objective of the attack is to gain an ability to introduce
error on load estimate. The adversary tries to achieve the
goal by maximizing the impact metrics, i.e., maximizing
‖Hin jKda‖2 for a (ka,kd)-tuple attack.
An optimal attack also targets to keep stealth against the
BDD, or at least minimize the detection probability. In the
case that the adversary has limited attack resources, the attacks
can be detected since the term S da in (17) may be non-zero.
We assume there exists an upper limit of detection probability
δ which is acceptable for the adversary. Thus according to
Subsection III-B, for the (ka,kd)-tuple attack, we can obtain∫ τd(α)
0
fλa,d (x)dx ≥ 1−δ, (20)
where the non-centrality parameter is λa,d = ‖R−1/2S da‖22 and
fλa,d (x) is the PDF of χ
2
m−n−kd (‖R−1/2S da‖22). For a given δ,
the non-centrality parameter satisfies λa,d = ‖R−1/2S da‖22 ≤ εa,d
where εa,d can be determined using (20).
Based on the aforementioned intuition, we consider the fol-
lowing optimization problem for the optimal attack strategy of
the (ka,kd)-tuple attack under the relaxation on the assumption
of attack resources,
max
a,d
‖Hin jKda‖22
s.t. ‖R−1/2S da‖22 ≤ εa,
‖a‖0 + ‖d‖0 ≤ R.
(21)
where R denotes the maximum number of measurements that
the attacker can manipulate.
B. Computation Solution
The optimization problem of (21) for a (ka,kd)-tuple attack
is non-convex and difficult to solve without the specifications
of the attack vectors [8]. We consider to add more constraints
on the attack vectors by setting the measurements which could
be attacked to be determined for a given ka and kd which
satisfy ka +kd ≤ R. Thus for this specifications of the non-zero
entries in attack vectors a and d, the above problem can be
equivalent to solve the following one,
min
a
εa,dϕ
s.t. Q−ϕW ≤ 0,
(22)
where Q = QsT Qs, W = WsT Ws, and for a givn d, Qs, Ws
are the submatrices of Hin jKd and R−1/2S d corresponding to
the non-zero entries of attack vector a. (22) also implies that
ϕ is the maximum generalized eigenvalue of the matrix pair
(Q,W), i.e., ϕ = λmax(Q,W) [18].
It should be noted that though the attack vectors are con-
strained in order to solve the optimization problem, the optimal
attacks for any given ka and kd which satisfy ka + kd ≤ R
can still be obtained using exhaustive search over all possible
attacked measurement sets. Some computationally efficient
algorithms can also be developed to solve (21). We leave this
for future work.
V. Case Study
In this section we apply the attack scenarios of limited
adversarial knowledge and limited attack resources to the
IEEE 14-bus system use case. Full measurements placement
is employed that power flow measurements are placed on all
the buses and transmission lines to provide large redundancy.
The per-unit system is used and the power base is 100MW.
The power flow measurements are generated by the DC model
with Gaussian noise (σi = 0.02 for all measurements). For
the limited knowledge scenario, we assume that the adversary
knows the exact topology of the system but has an estimated
line parameters with errors up to ±10%, ±20% and ±30%.
With different levels of error on estimation of line param-
eters, the detection probability of the attacks can be obtained
according to (18). We pick such case that measurement j = 9.
According to the optimal solution of (12) w.r.t. H˜ in (19), a
number of 11 measurements need to be manipulated by the
attacker. Figure 1 shows the detection probability of the (5,6)-
tuple attacks targeting on these 11 measurements. The x-axis
indicates the attack magnitude µ on measurement j using the
attack vector a = H˜dc. We can see that the detectability of
attack is intimately related to the error on estimation of line
parameters. With larger model uncertainty in building attack
vectors, the attack has higher possibility to be detected by
the BDD. The detection probability becomes much higher
when the error on estimation of line parameters increases.
This implies that in order to keep stealth, the adversary do
need good knowledge of the system model.
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Figure 1. The detection probability is plotted versus the attack magnitude µ
on measurement j = 9. The attacks are under there levels of error on estimation
of line parameters: ±10%, ±20% and ±30%. The false alarm rate is set to be
α = 0.05.
Next the simulations are conducted in the scenario where
the adversary has limited attack resources but full knowledge
of the system and the optimal attack strategy described in
(21) is used. The measurements that could be manipulated
are specified on a determined measurement set which is the
same as the one in the previous case, i.e., the set with
11 measurements containing measurement j = 9. If all the
measurements in this set are corrupted with enough attack
resources, the attack with full knowledge can perform the
optimal attack strategy in (11) and keep stealth. However,
in this scenario the attacker could only corrupt part of the
measurements in the set thus can be observed by the BDD.
Using (21), we compare the attack scenarios where the attacker
has limited resources to corrupt part of the measurements but
full knowledge and has limited knowledge but full resources
to corrupt all the measurements in this measurement set, as
shown in Figure 2. We can see that though the attacker
with limited resources can manipulate fewer measurements for
(10,0)-tuple attack and (4,6)-tuple attack with full knowledge,
they can have larger impact metrics comparing with the (11,0)-
tuple attack and (5,6)-tuple attack with limited knowledge of
the system. This implies the importance of the knowledge of
system model. From the system operator’s view, the system
model kept in the database of SCADA should be protected
well. Besides this also can be used to implement mitigation
schemes by misleading attacks to use perturbed or even faked
system model thus making them detectable.
Then the scenario that the attacker can corrupt even fewer
measurements is considered. Such (ka,kd)-tuple attack be-
comes a “sparse” attack. All of the possible attacked mea-
surement sets can be examined and the worst case with largest
attack impact metrics is selected. Table I gives the results of
the “sparse” optimal attacks. With a given δ and ka, kd, the
optimal attacks with largest attack impact metrics are obtained.
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Figure 2. The attack impact metric is plotted versus the detection probability
under the attacks with limited knowledge or resources respectively. For the
limited knowledge scenario, error on line parameters of ±20% is employed.
The false alarm rate is set to be α = 0.05.
Table I
Sparse Optimal Attacks with Limited Resources
Attacks Index I(a,d) /p.u.
(δ = 0.1)
I(a,d) /p.u.
(δ = 0.2)
(3,0)-tuple attack (7,27,45) 0.0585 0.0898
(2,0)-tuple attack (42,45) 0.0440 0.0676
(1,0)-tuple attack (44) 0.0354 0.0544
(2,1)-tuple attack (7,27,45) 0.0574 0.0881
(1,2)-tuple attack (7,27,45) 0.0551 0.0847
(1,1)-tuple attack (7,44) 0.0412 0.0633
Here the measurements index denotes the measurement set
manipulated by the attacker. Index 7 and 27 are line power flow
measurements on branch 7 (from bus 4 to bus 5) and 42, 44,
45 are bus power injection measurements on bus 2, 4, 5. We
can see that with more measurements corrupted by FDI attack,
the maximum impact metrics on errors of load estimate can
be larger. The results also indicate that the measurement set
(e.g., line power flow measurements on branch 7 and injection
measurements on bus 2,4,5) are vulnerable to the “sparse”
attacks from the view of the system operation and has the
priority of be equipped with mitigation schemes.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, we consider more realistic attacks with limited
adversarial knowledge and limited attack resources. The attack
is also generalized to include both data integrity and data
availability attacks. We show that the detection probability
of attacks increase when the error on parameter estimation
increase for the attack. The optimal attacks with limited attack
resources but full knowledge can be more damaging than
the ones with limited knowledge but enough attack resources
according to the detection probability and attack impact met-
rics, which implies the importance of the knowledge of the
system model to the attack. The results also suggest which
measurements are more vulnerable to “sparse” data attacks
that need to be protected with priority. Future work includes
the computationally efficient algorithms, using various attack
cost on different measurements, mitigation schemes, etc.
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